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ABSTRACT: While much attention has been paid to the role of divine inspiration in the 
case of Socrates within Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, this paper examines Plato’s 
late period works and argues that despite the drastic changes in methodology found in 
dialogues such as the Sophist and Philebus, Plato still acknowledges, and emphasizes, the 
role played by divine inspiration in regard to Socratic knowledge. 
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As Plato transitioned into his late period, the character of Socrates no longer 
consistently resides at center-stage of the dialogues. In dialogues such as the Sophist 
and Statesman, for example, we find in his place the Eleatic Stranger, an individual 
who utilizes a new methodology, i.e., collection and division, in his efforts towards 
the acquisition of definitional knowledge. Given the change in cast and methodology 
of the Sophist, Statesman, as well as the Laws1, it could be argued that Plato finally 
dismisses the more supernatural aspects of his earlier work2, favoring instead the 
                                                        
1 Indeed, in the Laws, Socrates is absent entirely. Also, while the method of collection and division 
is not used by the Athenian Stranger in the Laws, it is, in contrast to the earlier, and even middle 
periods, similarly rigid and meticulous in its presentation, lacking any traces of the elenchtic 
questioning that drives those earlier dialogues. 
2 As evidence to this claim, we find that throughout the early and middle period dialogues, Socrates 
consistently adheres to the warnings issued by his daimonion. Textual examples of such reliance 
include, but are in no way limited to: Apology 31c4-32a3, Euthydemus 272e1-3a3, and Phaedrus 
242b-c. In addition to his daimonion, Socrates also consistently recognizes the legitimacy of divine 
inspiration in the case of certain individuals. Examples of such instances can be found in the 
Apology (22b8-c4), as well as the Ion (534b1-c7). And, while some scholars, Martha Nussbaum, 
“Commentary on Edmunds,” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient 
Philosophy (1985) 1: 231-240, perhaps most notably, have dismissed these references to divine 
inspiration as instances of Socratic Irony, given the consistency of textual evidence to the contrary, 
such a position is, I would argue, untenable. For a comprehensive and thoroughly convincing 
argument that Plato took divine inspiration seriously throughout his early and middle periods, see 
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rigidly rational methodology prominently featured therein. Yet, while both the 
Eleatic Stranger of the Sophist and Statesman and the Athenian Stranger of the Laws, 
do not themselves directly appeal to the divine for assistance in their philosophical 
endeavors3, when we turn our attention to those dialogues of the late period where 
Socrates takes center stage, we are subject once more to a consistent appeal to the 
divine for assistance in his philosophical endeavor. Given this disparity, the question 
arises as to Plato’s views on Socrates in this late period, in particular the role that 
divine inspiration plays in the case of Socratic knowledge. 
To answer this question, however, requires that we address a problem that 
arises in Plato’s late period, i.e., the varying images of Socrates. To explain, in the 
late dialogues, we are given multiple images of Socrates, all of which are, at least on 
the surface, distinctly different than the last. In the Sophist, for example, we are 
presented with the image of Socrates as the ‘noble sophist,’ i.e., the individual who, 
through the elenchus, is able to purge his interlocutors of their false beliefs.4 In the 
Theaetetus, on the other hand, a dialogue that serves as the dramatic predecessor to 
the Sophist, we are presented with a slightly different image, i.e., Socrates as 
                                                        
Mark L. McPherran, The Religion of Socrates (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1996), as well as Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Plato’s Socrates (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994). 
3 It should be noted here that despite the Athenian Stranger’s lack of appeal to the divine for direct 
assistance in his own presentation of the laws, it is argued consistently throughout the laws that 
the gods and their supreme wisdom must serve as the foundation for the laws of men. See Laws 
903bb-905d, 907a, 967b.  
4 While this is not explicitly stated to be describing Socrates in the dialogue itself, I would argue 
that we ought to understand the 6th definition as presented in the Sophist to be a description of 
Socrates. As we read at Soph. 230b3-c2, “They cross-examine someone when he thinks he is saying 
something though he is saying nothing. Then, since his opinions will vary inconsistently, these 
people will easily scrutinize them. They will collect his opinions together during the discussion, 
put them side by side, and show that they conflict with each other at the same time on the same 
subjects in relation to the same things and in the same respects. The people who are being 
examined see this, get angry at themselves, and become calmer towards others. They lose their 
inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter to hear or has a more 
lasting effect on them.”  
For support of this view, see C.C.W. Taylor, “Socrates the Sophist,” in Remembering Socrates, ed. 
Lindsay Judson and Vassilis Karasmanis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 168. See also 
Dorothea Frede, “The Hedonist’s Conversion: The Role of Socrates in the Philebus,” in Form and 
Argument in Late Plato, ed. Cristopher Gill and M.M. McCabe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 
223. Frede notes that the 6th definition “seems to represent something like Plato’s last word on 
Socrates.”  
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midwife. Here, Socrates is able to assist in the delivery of wisdom from within the 
mind of his interlocutor. And, while this may seem similar to the ‘noble sophist’ as 
described in the Sophist, given the more positive capacity exhibited by the expertise 
of mental midwifery, such an image of Socrates appears markedly different from the 
strictly purgative Socrates of the Sophist. Finally, in the Philebus, we are yet again 
presented with a seemingly distinct Socrates, one who takes up the method of 
collection and division as his weapon of choice in the search for the definition of the 
good life. As before, this new image of Socrates seems to be set apart from his fellow 
late period Socratic counterparts, most notably in his apparent acceptance of the 
superiority of the method of collection and division over his traditional elenchtic 
approach.  
Yet, despite these seemingly disparate depictions of Socrates, I would argue 
that we ought to see these varying images as one and the same character, with each 
depiction highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of Plato’s mentor as he has now 
come to see him. And, while this position will be argued in full in the pages to follow, 
it is important to note here at the outset that, regardless of the differences in 
methodology utilized by the varying depictions, there arises a common thread that 
carries through these late period Socratic dialogues, i.e., Socrates’ unwavering appeal 
and adherence to his divine voice. Given this consistency despite all else, it is my 
position that Plato maintains his continued belief regarding the influence of divine 
inspiration in the case of Socrates. 
Divine Inspiration in the Late Dialogues 
The Divine and the Statesman in the Statesman 
Given the many changes that arise in Plato’s late period, before turning our attention 
to Socrates in particular, it is necessary to first establish that Plato’s recognition of 
the validity of divine inspiration is not limited to a nostalgic portrait of his mentor. 
To do so, we look first to two dialogues of Plato’s late period that do not feature 
Socrates as its protagonist, the Statesman and the Laws. 
Looking first to the Statesman, we find that, according to the Eleatic Stranger, 
the role of the divine is of significant importance to what Plato will regard as the 
true ruler.5 As the stranger explains, in order to establish stability, the rulers must 
                                                        
5 In this argument I follow closely that of Stephan Büttner, “Inspiration and Inspired Poets in 
Plato’s Dialogues,” in Plato and the Poets, ed. Pierre Destree and F.G. Hermann (Leiden and 
Boston: Brill, 2011), 119-120.  
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possess the ability to reconcile seemingly incompatible individuals under their rule.6 
As an example, the Stranger notes that, if not properly handled, a conflict will 
inevitably arise between those individuals who are more inclined towards the virtue 
of courage and those who favor a more moderate approach. While both courage and 
moderation are virtues to be praised, given the disparity between the two, the course 
of favored action between individuals occupying the opposing worldviews will quite 
often be in conflict. Thus, to avoid this potential confrontation, the ruler must 
possess the ability to ‘interweave’ the two together to create a harmony that is 
conducive to each individual, as well as the society at large.  
In response to the question posed in the dialogue by Young Socrates as to how 
the ruler is able to peacefully mix these two dichotomous individuals together, the 
Stranger explains that the ruler has two options: (1) through creating a mortal bond 
between the two, i.e., by uniting them through marriage,7 and (2) by “fitting 
together that part of their soul that is eternal with a divine bond.”8 To elaborate on 
precisely what is meant by the forging of a “divine bond,” the stranger explains as 
follows: 
I call divine, when it comes to be in souls, that opinion about what is fine and good, 
and the opposite of these, which is really true and guaranteed; it belongs to the class 
of the more human…Then we do recognize that it belongs to the statesman and 
the good legislator alone to be capable of bringing this thing about, by means of the 
music that belongs to the art of kingship, in those that had their correct share of 
education.9 
Thus, the statesman possesses the ability to instill within the citizenry the 
correct opinions on matters of the Good, Beauty, Justice, etc., which, in turn, will 
prevent them from veering off into the extreme form of whatever virtue they may 
naturally favor. So, for instance, lacking in such guidance, the courageous individual 
will, through unchecked aggression, eventually become more of a beast than a 
man.10 As such, it is the responsibility of the true statesman to introduce the 
courageous individual to ideas that properly highlight the benefit of a more 
moderate approach in certain instances, to educate him in such a way as to instill a 
                                                        
6 Pol. 308d-309c. 
7 Pol. 310b2-4. 
8 Pol. 309c1-2. 
9 Pol. 309c4-d5. 
10 Pol. 309e1-4. 
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balance in his soul.11 It is important to note, however, that the Statesman is not 
claimed to possess the knowledge of these things, but rather, merely the correct 
opinions. Thus, we are provided the image of the divinely inspired individual who, 
while lacking knowledge of their own, is in possession of correct opinions, i.e., they 
have access to truth.12 Further, given the sincerity of this description, not to mention 
the pivotal role this divinely gifted skill of interweaving plays for the stranger in the 
final definition of the true statesman, that Plato would ironically attribute this 
ability to divine provenance seems distinctly improbable.13  
Divine Inspiration in the Laws 
In addition to the role of the divine in the Statesman, we also find instances within 
the Laws wherein the Athenian Stranger14 specifically refers to divine inspiration.  
                                                        
11 While there are indeed differences between the Republic and the Laws, I would contend that 
the two texts are, in fact, surprisingly similar, a point which can be seen here in the stated 
importance that the soul, and the balancing thereof, plays in the establishment of justice in the 
polis. For more on the similarities between the Laws and Republic, see Daniel Larkin, “Paint Him? 
I Hardly Know Him: Reconciling Plato’s Aesthetics in the Laws and Republic Book X,” Paper 
presented at the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Conference, New York, NY, 2015. 
12 See Büttner, “Inspiration and Inspired Poets,” 120. Büttner adds that such an image of the true 
statesman, i.e., one that, through a connection to the divine is in possession of correct opinions, 
and, as such, is able to properly guide his subjects in matters of ethics and morality, is consistent 
with earlier depictions of the divine ruler, most notably in the Meno 98e7-99d.  
13 Büttner, “Inspiration and Inspired Poets,” 120. 
14 It has been suggested by some scholars (such as Leo Strauss, The Argument and the Action of 
Plato’s Laws. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), and Thomas L. Pangle, “The Political 
Psychology of Religion in Plato's Laws,” American Political Science Review 70, 4 (1976): 1059-77) 
that the Athenian Stranger represents Socrates. In support of this position, Aristotle’s Politics 
1265a is often referenced, as, transitioning from his analysis of the Republic to the Laws Aristotle 
writes, “Now it is true that all the discourses of Socrates possess brilliance, cleverness, originality 
and keenness of inquiry, but it is no doubt difficult to be right about everything.” However, while 
this passage might be seen as Aristotle identifying Socrates as the Athenian Stranger, we find that 
Aristotle never explicitly states this connection. Further, later on in this same passage, Aristotle 
refers to the author of the Laws as ‘the writer,’ whereas in his description of the Republic the 
preceding passage, Aristotle consistently identifies Socrates by name. Additionally, given Plato’s 
willingness to use Socrates in other late dialogues, it would seem odd that he would, in his final 
work, feel the need to hide Socrates behind a curtain of anonymity. In support of this position, see 
also Kevin M. Cherry, “Politics and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Critique of Plato’s Laws,” in Natural 
Right and Political Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Catherine Zuckert and Michael Zuckert, ed. 
Ann Ward and Lee Ward (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 50-66. On Cherry’s 
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To begin, we look to 682a, where we read: 
He (Homer) composed these lines… under some sort of inspiration from God. And 
how true to life they are! This is because poets, as a class are divinely gifted and are 
inspired when they sing, so that with the help of Graces and Muses they frequently 
hit on how things really happen. 
Here we find direct testimony regarding the ability to those divinely inspired to gain 
access to truth. Note, however, the Stranger is not claiming that such moments of 
divine revelation result in the acquisition of knowledge, a point which is once more 
strikingly consistent with comments regarding divine inspiration as seen in the 
earlier dialogues, most notably the Apology.15 Yet, while the divinely inspired may 
lack knowledge insofar as he cannot provide an account for that which is gifted to 
him, he nevertheless stumbles upon the truth, an occurrence that arises with such 
consistency that it cannot be reduced to mere coincidence or luck.  
Interestingly, that Plato takes such moments of actual inspiration seriously is 
made clear in another passage found later in the Laws, one that serves as a warning 
of the potential dangers that arise from adhering to the revelations as given by the 
gods. We read at 719c: 
When a poet takes his seat on the tripod of the muse, he cannot control his 
thoughts. He is like a fountain where the water is allowed to gush forth unchecked. 
His art is the art of representation, and when he represents men with contrasting 
characters he is often obliged to contradict himself, and he does not know which 
of the opposing speeches contains the truth. But for the legislator this is impossible, 
he must not let his law say two different things on the same subject. 
From this section we might glean a number of important points. First, while 
the passage does indicate that the inspired poet cannot determine which of his gifted 
revelations contains the truth, we do find the Stranger indirectly noting that the 
truth is revealed. The problem, then, is not the source of the revelation, nor the 
potential veracity of such revelation, but rather the inspired individual’s lack of 
understanding. In other words, we are once again given evidence that Plato, through 
the Athenian Stranger, recognizes that the truth can be, and is, revealed through 
moments of divine inspiration. Second, it is admittedly true that this passage is 
presented with an admonitory tone, warning us that the legislator cannot rely on 
divine inspiration in matters of law, as the contradictory accounts that so often 
                                                        
view, “What (Aristotle) finds most praiseworthy about the Socratic dialogues—their searching, or 
zetetic character—seems to be wholly absent from the Laws.”  
15 Ap. 22c1-3. 
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accompany revelation would be detrimental to the consistency required for a stable 
constitution. However, while this warning clearly indicates a hesitancy to rely upon 
divinely inspired revelation for matters of law, it does not condemn such revelation 
as chicanery, but rather, once more indicates a sincere belief in its legitimacy, albeit 
one that should be approached with caution.  
Images of Socrates in the Late Dialogues  
With the evidence from the Statesman and the Laws now established, we can 
proceed on to our analysis of Socrates and the role of divine inspiration in Plato’s 
late dialogues. As noted above, while he is often silent, or even absent, from many 
of the later dialogues, he is very much present in others. This is most apparent in the 
Theaetetus, a dialogue which dramatically precedes the Sophist and Statesman, and 
in the Philebus, an oddly ‘Socratic’ dialogue wherein Socrates, though similar in 
many ways to the Socrates of the early period,16 often substitutes the elenchos for 
the new method of division. In addition to these two obvious examples, I would add 
a third, i.e., the image of Socrates as indirectly presented via the 6th definition of 
sophistry as found in the Sophist. And, while these three presentations of Socrates 
may, at first glance, strike us as three distinct representations of Socrates, I would 
argue that, when viewed through the lens of divine inspiration, these somewhat 
disparate images of Socrates are revealed as one and the same, each image providing 
a deeper insight into Plato’s late understanding of his mentor, and the role that 
divine inspiration plays in his philosophical endeavors and ability. 
 
Setting the Stage for Change: Socrates as Midwife in the Theaetetus 
In terms of chronological events within the dialogues, the Theaetetus is the direct 
predecessor to the Sophist and Statesman. And, given the Sophist and Statesman 
both feature the Eleatic Stranger as its protagonist, it is of note that the Theaetetus 
features Socrates front and center, leading a discussion regarding the definition of 
                                                        
16 See Frede, “The Hedonist’s Conversion,” 215. Frede notes a number of striking similarities that 
are almost nostalgic in effect: (1) The dialogue begins abruptly, which recalls similar literary 
approaches as found in the Meno and Gorgias. (2) Socrates claims that moral mistakes are 
involuntary (22b). (3) The different pleasures and kinds of knowledge are afforded the opportunity 
to speak for themselves, which, as Frede notes, ought to remind us of the Crito, wherein the Laws 
themselves are personified. 
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knowledge. Interestingly, despite its late placement in the Platonic corpus, in many 
ways the Theaetetus may strike the reader as fairly reminiscent of the earlier Socratic 
dialogues, for not only is the dialogue fairly elenchtic in nature, but further, it ends 
in aporia!17  
Yet, despite this familiar mise-en-scene, if examined closely, it becomes 
apparent that this familiarity is actually a forbearer of change for Plato, not only in 
terms of a break from the middle period,18 but also as an indication of the need for 
new developments, i.e., the methodology found predominantly in the Sophist and 
Statesman.19 In defense of this position, let us look first to the image of Socrates we 
are presented with at the beginning of the dialogue: Socrates as midwife.  
Typically speaking, a midwife is an individual who is instrumental in the 
birthing process, not only in their ability to rightly determine when a woman is 
pregnant, but further, and more importantly, aides in the delivery of that child. 
Regarding the midwifery of Socrates, however, there are some critical differences. 
As Socrates explains: 
                                                        
17 Tht. 210a8-b2. While the dialogue does successfully determine what knowledge is not, i.e., 
perception, true judgment, or an account added to true judgment, the discussion fails to find a 
satisfactory definition of knowledge. Also, given the contextual connection to the Sophist and the 
significant change in cast and methodology that comes with that dialogue, the methodology used 
by Socrates in the Theaetetus, and its failure to achieve satisfactory results in the eyes of the 
interlocutors, is, I believe, of significant importance. For the contrary position, i.e., that the 
Theaetetus does end with a positive account of knowledge (or at the very least, human knowledge) 
see David Sedley, The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). 
18 M.F. Burnyeat, “Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration,” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical 
Studies, 24 (1977): 7-16, argues that Plato appears to distance himself from the metaphysical 
commitments he introduced in his middle period, e.g., the theory of recollection, as well as, to an 
extent, the theory of the forms. Indeed, we see this at Tht. 188a, where the idea of recollection is 
somewhat dismissed outright. Further, and of particular interest, Burnyeat draws the distinction 
between the image of the barren midwife in the Theaetetus and that of the pregnant Socrates of 
the Symposium. In both dialogues, the imagery of pregnancy and delivery are used to explain the 
development of ideas, however, whereas in the Symposium, Socrates seems to be in possession of 
the wisdom himself, the Socrates of the Theaetetus cannot make such a claim, as he admits that he 
is barren. I agree with Burnyeat that this revisiting of theme is not coincidental, and would add 
that this once more indicates that Plato is rethinking and breaking from his more positive account 
of the Socratic method as found in the middle period. 
19 Granted, the method of collection and division is utilized by Socrates in the Philebus. However, 
it is my contention that such use only further proves the point that Socrates is ill equipped to use 
the methodology, as his inability to utilize it properly shows.  
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The difference is that I attend to men, not women, and that I watch over the labor 
of their souls, not of their bodies. And the most important thing about my art is the 
ability to apply all possible tests to the offspring, to determine whether the young 
mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth.20 
In short, Socrates aids in the delivery of wisdom, guiding his interlocutors in 
the development of their own beliefs and ideas. Further, in line with his consistent 
disavowal of knowledge, Socrates admits that, similar to actual midwives’ inability 
to have children themselves, he is himself barren of all wisdom. Thus, Socrates 
explains, when an interlocutor does succeed in the discovery of wisdom through 
their interaction, it is not from Socrates that this wisdom arose, but from within the 
interlocutor alone.21 
However, while Socrates adamantly maintains that any wisdom delivered is 
not his own, he does insist that he plays a critical role in the discovery of truth. As 
evidence to this claim Socrates points to those individuals who, failing to recognize 
the role of Socrates in the delivery process, mistakenly believe that the truth was 
discovered by their work alone. By Socrates’ account, these unfortunate pupils who 
leave his tutelage prematurely, believing themselves to be fully capable of delivering 
additional truths without the assistance of their former midwife, are destined to fall 
back into the very ignorance from which he so selflessly delivered them. As Socrates 
explains: 
After they have gone away from me they have resorted to harmful company, with 
the result that what has remained in them has miscarried; while they have 
neglected the children I helped them bring forth, and lost them, because they set 
more value upon lies and phantoms than upon the truth; finally they have been set 
down for ignorant fools, both by themselves and by everyone else.22 
Thus, based on this testimony, it is clear that Socrates believes that he plays a 
fundamental role in the delivery of wisdom from the minds of his interlocutors.  
Yet, this certainty on the part of Socrates regarding his role in both the 
delivery, and rearing, of truth should strike us as perplexing. Given his admitted lack 
of wisdom, questions arise as to how Socrates is able to (1) exude such confidence in 
his ability, (2) successfully determine who is (and is not) worthy of his tutelage, and 
(3) successfully determine which ideas are in fact true. And, similar to the evidence 
found in the early dialogues regarding Socrates’ seemingly inexplicable abilities, we 
                                                        
20 Tht. 150b7-c3. 
21 Tht. 150d6-7. 
22 Tht. 150e2-151a. 
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find that the answer to each of these questions arises through an appeal to divine 
inspiration. 
Beginning with the first inquiry regarding the confidence exuded by Socrates 
regarding his own abilities, we find that, similar to statements made as early as the 
Apology,23 the reason why the Socrates of the Theaetetus engages in such mental 
midwifery is that he is compelled by the god to do so.24 Indeed, as Socrates notes, 
not only is his engagement in mental midwifery ordered by the god, but further, it 
is the god himself that leaves Socrates barren.25 Thus, given this lack of wisdom, it 
cannot be the case that Socrates, in recognition of his own wisdom, feels obligated 
to instruct others. Rather, it is divine command alone that serves as the catalyst, 
spurring him on towards the assisting of young minds in the development of their 
ideas. And, given Socrates’ belief in the superiority of divine wisdom to human 
wisdom,26 a point made clear to Socrates throughout his life via the advice of his 
daimonion, the origin of Socrates’ confidence regarding his role as midwife is made 
quite clear. 
Moving now to the question of Socrates’s determination of which students are 
worthy of his assistance, we find once more Socrates directly attributing this ability 
to the divine. As we read at 151a1-6: 
Sometimes (those that leave) come back, wanting my company again, and ready to 
move heaven and earth to get it. When that happens, in some cases the divine sign 
that visits me forbids me to associate with them; in others, it permits me, and then 
they begin to make progress. 
We see here, yet again, direct testimony to the involvement of the daimonion 
in the decision making process of Socrates. What is also of interest here is the 
similarity to the description of the daimonion as understood in the early dialogues, 
both dissuading Socrates from engaging in activities that he ought to avoid,27 as well 
as the more positive act of permitting other action.28 The point here is that we find 
a continued acceptance of Socratic appeal to the divine in these later dialogues, an 
                                                        
23 See Zina Giannopoulou, Plato’s Theaetetus as a Second Apology (Oxford University Press, 2013), 
for a critical comparison of the Theaetetus and Apology. 
24 Tht. 150c9, Ap. 30e, 28e, 29d. 
25 Tht. 150c8. 
26 Ap. 23a4-b2. 
27 For example, engaging in a life of politics. See Ap. 31c4-32a3 
28 As we find at Ap. 40c1, Socrates notes that the silence of his divine sign is to be taken as 
affirmation of his course of action. 
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acceptance that is consistent in manner and tone. In other words, if it were the case 
that Plato were trying to distance himself from the more fantastical aspects of 
Socrates ability from the early dialogues, one might think that by the time he set out 
to write the Theaetetus, an intricately woven treatise on the nature of human 
knowledge, such whimsical references to the supernatural would be absent, or at the 
very least relegated to a significantly diminished role. However, given Socrates’ 
consistent and unapologetic appeals to the wisdom of such divine insight, it is 
difficult to see how such a claim could withstand this blatant textual evidence to the 
contrary. 
Finally, we look to the most interesting of the above concerns, i.e., how 
Socrates, a man who lacks all wisdom himself, is able to determine which ideas are 
true, and which are false. To answer this, let us look very briefly to the methodology 
employed by Socrates in the Theaetetus. In the Theaetetus we are once more 
presented with a Socrates who consistently admits his own ignorance, knowing 
nothing of the topic at hand himself.29 And, while this may not seem a remarkable 
point, we find that such consistent admissions of absolute ignorance are, in a way, a 
return to form for Socrates. To explain, while the earlier dialogues are rife with such 
pleas of ignorance, as Plato develops into his middle period, we find a change in the 
character of Socrates as well.30 Specifically, in such middle period dialogues as the 
Meno, Republic, and Symposium, we find Socrates now holding a variety of 
metaphysical commitments, e.g., recollection, the forms, etc., that neither the 
Socrates of the early dialogues, nor the Socrates found in the Theaetetus maintain. 
Thus, with the image of Socrates as midwife we find Plato giving up on many of the 
conventions introduced in his middle period, conventions that, I would argue, were 
used as attempts to build upon the Socratic method, allowing for a more positive 
methodology, as opposed to one used merely to expose the inconsistencies in the 
beliefs of others.31 Thus, the Socrates of the Theaetetus does not possess any wisdom 
of his own. Thus, he does not, and cannot, impregnate his interlocutors with his own 
ideas as sophists do,32 but rather, merely assists in the delivery via the elenchtic form 
of questioning more reminiscent of his earlier engagements.  
                                                        
29 Tht. 151c4-d1, 161b1-b4, 161e5-8, 184b. 
30 Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, 
50 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 46-49. See also, Burnyeat, “Socratic 
Midwifery.”  
31 See also, Burnyeat, “Socratic Midwifery,” 57. 
32 Tht. 151b. 
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Yet, despite his lack of wisdom, we recall that, in the Theaetetus, Socrates 
does claim that he is able to determine which ideas are worthy and which should be 
discarded. Since such determination cannot be the result of his own wisdom (as he 
admits none of his own), I would once more suggest that, on the view of Socrates, 
this inexplicable ability is made possible, at least in part, by divine assistance, a claim 
which, again, is admitted to by Socrates himself.33 This claim is supported by a 
number of factors: (1) As noted above, in his description of his own ability, Socrates 
consistently refers to divine influence as a major component of his craft. (2) The 
image of Socrates as midwife that we are presented with in the Theaetetus is quite 
similar to the Socrates of the early dialogues, i.e., an individual who, unlike the more 
protreptic figure of the middle dialogues, is able to properly guide his interlocutor 
away from false beliefs without admitting any wisdom of his own, yet, is effectively 
guided by his divine sign. And, (3) given Plato’s acceptance of divine inspiration as 
a plausible source of assistance in these earlier works,34 when we consider the 
nostalgic portrayal of Socrates found in the Theaetetus, it stands to reason that we 
ought take Socrates (and thus Plato) at his word regarding the role of the divine in 
the case of Socrates in the Theaetetus. 
Evidence from the Philebus 
Yet, while the Theaetetus might provide us with an image of Socrates as reliant upon 
divine inspiration, the image of the midwife is not the only version of Socrates we 
are given in the late period. Indeed, in what would seem to be a directly 
contradictory image to the classically elenchtic Socrates of the Theaetetus, we find 
in the Philebus a Socrates that seems to do away with the elenchos altogether in 
favor of the method of collection and division! Yet, despite these disparate 
appearances, I would argue that the evidence in the Philebus only lends additional 
support to my position. My reasons are as follows: (1) Socrates is not especially adept 
in his deployment of the method of division, a lack of expertise which I will argue 
only helps prove my position that Plato does not consider Socrates to be a 
philosopher in the unqualified sense at this later stage of Plato’s development. (2) 
While Socrates does indeed use the new method of collection and division, to aide 
in his progress he consistently appeals to, and relies upon, divine assistance. Thus, 
while the Socrates of the Philebus, insofar as he discards the elenchos in favor of the 
                                                        
33 Tht. 150d7-e2. See also Burnyeat, “Socratic Midwifery,” 60-61. Burnyeat here points to such a 
possibility, though he does not strongly commit. 
34 See n. 2 
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method of collection and division, may, prima facie, appear to be in direct opposition 
to the image of Socrates as depicted in the 6th definition of the Sophist (let alone the 
midwife of the Theaetetus), I would argue that upon closer examination, the 
seemingly different images of Socrates we are given are not as disparate as they might 
first appear.  
Socrates and the Method of Division 
It is widely accepted that the Philebus should be counted amongst Plato’s latest 
dialogues.35 Given the dialogue’s placement in the corpus, and, considering the 
diminished role of Socrates in the late period, the question arises as to why Plato 
would choose Socrates as his protagonist. In answer to this question, some scholars 
have suggested that perhaps the reemergence of Socrates is owed to the ethical 
nature of the discussion at hand.36 Yet, while I do agree that the earlier dialogues do 
primarily focus on more practical matters, such concerns are not entirely absent in 
the late period, especially when taking the overall project of the Laws into 
consideration.37 If the sole reason for Socrates’ resurrection was simply on account 
of the topic’s connection to more traditionally Socratic themes, then it seems odd to 
render him silent or absent entirely from other dialogues which feature similar 
connections to earlier dialogues.38  
                                                        
35 See Leonard Brandwood, The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), and G.R. Ledger, Re-counting Plato: A Computer Analysis of Plato's Style 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), cited in Frede, “The Hedonist’s Conversion,” 214. 
36 R.A.H. Waterfield, “The Place of the ‘Philebus’ in Plato’s Dialogues”, Phronesis 25, no. 3 (1980): 
270-305.  
37 It should be noted that Socrates’ general interest in matters pertaining to ethics does not preclude 
his interest in other, more theoretical fields of inquiry. For example, there is evidence to suggest 
that Socrates, as early as the Euthyphro, was very much concerned with epistemological issues, as 
well as matters of methodology. It is perhaps too long of an argument to make in full here, 
however, I will point out that we need think only of Socrates’ response to Euthyphro’s first attempt 
to define piety. On Socrates’ view, Euthyphro’s first attempt fails to capture the definition of piety 
itself, as it is merely an example of an action that might be considered pious. Indeed, given Socrates’ 
attention to acquiring the proper definition, one that satisfies the definitional requirements 
stipulated by Socrates, it is not altogether clear that we can entirely divorce the epistemological 
from the moral in these early dialogues. 
38 See Frede, “The Hedonist’s Conversion,” 215. On Frede’s view, not only would Socrates, on these 
grounds, be qualified to lead the discussion regarding the ideal state as found in the Laws, but 
similarly, in the Timaeus 19b-20c, Socrates would appear qualified and willing to discuss the ideal 
state, and yet, passes this duty on to Timaeus and Critias. 
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Given the implausibility of the above suggestion, I would argue that there 
must exist other reasons as to Plato’s selection of Socrates in the Philebus. And, in 
this vein, I agree with Dorothea Frede’s claim that Plato’s use of Socrates in the 
Philebus was, at least in part, to distinguish Socrates from the master dialectician.39 
To quickly recap, while Socrates does indeed discuss the ‘divine method’ of division, 
and further, uses it throughout the dialogue to determine the proper ranking of 
goods,40 the dialogue ends with Protarchus noting to Socrates that the task is not 
complete, and that Socrates should continue on to finish what he started.41 And, 
while this incomplete result is fairly common (if not expected) for a ‘Socratic’ 
dialogue, when compared to the Sophist and Statesman, two dialogues that feature 
the same method of collection and division, we find the conclusions to be strikingly 
different, as both dialogues end with a clear agreement that a definition has been 
reached by the Eleatic Stranger. Looking first to the Sophist 268c7-268d, we find the 
following exchange to close out the dialogue: 
VISITOR: Shall we weave his name together from start to finish and tie it up the 
way we did before? 
THEAETETUS: Of Course. 
VISITOR: Imitation of the contrary-speech producing, insincere and unknowing 
sort, of the appearance making kind of copy making, the word juggling part of 
production that’s marked off as human and not divine. Anyone who says the sophist 
is of this ‘blood and family’ will be saying, it seems, the complete truth. 
THEAETETUS: Absolutely. 
Further, a definitive conclusion of this sort is echoed in the Statesman as well, 
for, at the end of the Statesman, following the final recap of their efforts towards 
defining the statesman, Socrates himself responds as follows at 311c4-7: “Another 
most excellent portrait, visitor, this one that you have completed for us, of the man 
who possesses the art of kingship: the statesman.”42  
We find then a striking contrast between the three dialogues: While all three 
dialogues feature the method of division, only those wherein it is the Eleatic stranger 
leading the discussion does the discussion conclude definitively. On the other hand, 
in the Philebus, where it is Socrates, not the Stranger, using the method of division, 
                                                        
39 See Frede, “The Hedonist’s Conversion,” 229-232.  
40 Phil 66a-d. 
41 Phil. 67b. 
42 Italics added for emphasis. 
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we are left wanting, as the dialogue ends in incompletion. Given this 
inconclusiveness, I would once more state that this is precisely the point, i.e., that 
Plato, through his use of Socrates in this way, is demonstrating the need for a mastery 
of this new method if one is to achieve definitive results. And, given his affinity for 
Socrates, and the skill exhibited by Socrates throughout Plato’s corpus, that Socrates 
would be shown to be inefficient is perhaps that most compelling way for Plato to 
emphasize this point.  
The Role of Divine Inspiration in the Philebus 
Yet, while it is true that Socrates ultimately fails to bring about the definitive 
conclusion presented in other late dialogues, I would argue that we are not to take 
this failure as an indication that Plato has lost faith in the methodology or ability of 
his mentor. In fact, I would suggest that, similar to the depictions of Socrates we are 
given in the Theaetetus and Sophist, the Socrates of the Philebus is presented as a 
reflection of Plato’s mature understanding of his teacher, one which, as with those 
other depictions already described, once more prominently features an attention to 
the role of divine inspiration in the methodology of Socrates.  
To begin, it should be noted that, despite his failure to properly execute the 
method of division, Socrates is still able to proceed quite far into the discussion. This 
ability to do so despite his lack of expertise is particularly interesting, especially 
when we consider Socrates’ consistent appeal to the divine throughout the dialogue: 
(1) The method itself is called, by Socrates, the “divine method” (18b6), (2) there is 
a prayer for divine assistance to help establish the fourfold division of all being (25b), 
(3) Socrates consistently refers to the difference between the human and divine 
mind (22c), and (4) Socrates appeals to the differences between the divine and 
human ideal condition (33b).43 In this evidence we see, once again, that Socrates, 
even when utilizing the new, rigid method of division, does not waver from his 
appreciation of divine assistance. 
Yet, while this attention to divine influence should be of no surprise at this 
point in the case of Socrates, we are presented with one extraordinary piece of 
textual evidence that demands our attention. Following his praiseful description of 
the divine method of division, we find, now faced with a potential roadblock in in 
their discussion, Socrates, abandoning the method of division, proclaims that they 
                                                        
43 Frede, “The Hedonist’s Conversion,” n. 36. It should be added that points (3) and (4), while not 
directly related to divine assistance, do reinforce the idea that Socrates would take seriously the 
wisdom of the divine over human wisdom.  
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need not be concerned, as, “some memory has come to my mind that one of the gods 
seems to have sent me to help us.”44 This single line is of exceptional importance as, 
in striking contrast to the apotreptic messages of the daimonion in which Socrates 
was warned against a particular course of action, here, in the Philebus, we are given 
textual evidence wherein Socrates is claiming to have received a positive message 
directly from the gods. And, in the context of the dialogue, this revelation bestowed 
upon Socrates, i.e., that neither pleasure nor knowledge is the good, but rather a 
third thing which is superior to both, is instrumental for the remainder of the 
discussion.  
Granted, one could argue that such a direct appeal to the divine ought to be 
taken as an ironic gesture. However, given the staggering amount of evidence that 
has been presented against such a claim, evidence that is found throughout the entire 
Platonic corpus, such a claim seems, to me, to be particularly unfounded. Thus, 
instead of approaching this problem from a skeptic’s perspective, I suggest that we 
take this moment of positive divine influence with the utmost sincerity, as doing so 
would provide us insight into how we are to understand Socrates in Plato’s later 
dialogues. To explain, as we have seen, the Socrates of the Philebus is presented as 
not entirely skilled regarding the method of division. And yet, he is able to continue 
the discussion significantly further than would be expected for someone lacking in 
expertise. And, while this lack in ability would have crippled other individuals, 
Socrates, through the direct assistance of the gods, is able to proceed onward.  
The point I am attempting to convey here is that, in the Philebus, we are given 
insight into Plato’s understanding of his mentor. To explain, as I have argued, as 
Plato progressed into his late period, his conception of philosophy has evolved. As 
such, he has come to realize that Socrates can no longer qualify as the embodiment 
of what the philosopher ought be in an unqualified sense. In short, Plato came to 
realize that the Socratic method, while useful for tearing down fallacious arguments 
and exposing inconsistencies in the beliefs of others, is unable to achieve the sort of 
definitional knowledge he desired. And yet, despite this inability, Socrates does seem 
to know things, i.e., his opinions and instincts always seem to be inexplicably 
pointed towards the truth. To account for this then, what we find in these late 
dialogues are images of Socrates wherein the role played by divine inspiration is 
placed front and center. Here in the Philebus we see evidence of Socrates, unable to 
push forward in the discussion, directly assisted by the gods. Whereas others would 
have faltered, or given up, Socrates, through divine revelation is able to continue. 
                                                        
44 Phil. 20b3-4. Italics added for emphasis. 
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And, it should be noted, that this revelation occurs must be seen as positive in the 
eyes of Plato. In other words, while it is true that Socrates must rely on divine 
assistance to proceed in the discussion, such assistance does not diminish the results 
of the discussion, especially when one considers the reverence shown by Plato to 
the wisdom of the gods.  
Yet, while Plato does, in the case of Socrates, hold such divine revelation in 
high esteem, it is my view that he recognizes the limitations and potential pitfalls of 
reliance upon those few fortunate individuals lucky enough to be so inspired. 
Indeed, we might glean insight into this view when we consider the ending of the 
Philebus, wherein we recall that, despite Socrates being able to rank the various 
types of goods, Protarchus reminds him that his task is incomplete. To explain, we 
recall that in the Sophist and Statesman, an emphasis was placed on maintaining the 
proper divisions all the way through to the conclusion. In other words, the method 
of division is so effective because each division can be traced back and explained to 
any who would inquire. In the Philebus, however, we recall that the initial idea that 
spawned the discussion, i.e., that neither pleasure or knowledge alone was the good, 
was given to Socrates by divine inspiration. As such, this wisdom is not possessed by 
Socrates, and is thus unexplainable. No account can be given, and so, the division 
cannot be considered complete. Thus, while Socrates, via his divine connection, is 
able to proceed further in the discussion than the uninspired many, and, while this 
can be positive given the possibilities such inspiration provide,45 Plato recognizes the 
need for a methodology that does not rely on the assistance of the divine, hence his 
development of the method of division.46 
Conclusion  
Thus, despite the limitations that may be related to reliance upon divine inspiration 
in matters of philosophy, it is quite clear that, in the case of Socrates, Plato still 
recognizes its value. Indeed, when we look to the three major images of Socrates 
presented in the late dialogues, we find that, despite surface discrepancies, the 
common link between them is their reliance upon and reverence for the divine. As 
                                                        
45 See Phaedrus 243e-245b. In Socrates’ Second Speech, Philosophy is described as a form of 
madness. See also Francisco Gonzales, “The Hermeneutics of Madness,” in Plato and the Poets, ed. 
Pierre Destree and F.G. Hermann (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011). 
46 Additionally, we are left without the precise ratios between pleasure and knowledge. 
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such, we find cause to take seriously the role of the divine in the case of Socrates in 
Plato’s late dialogues.47 
                                                        
47 The objection might be raised here that we ought to understand the dialogues in a more skeptical 
light, especially given the more aporetic nature of the majority of the so-called Socratic dialogues. 
In this view, my position, which depends on seeing Plato (and by extension, the character of 
Socrates) as holding firm convictions regarding theological beliefs, arises as problematic. In 
response to this critique, however, we might look to the Laws, wherein we find evidence to 
support the contrary position, i.e., that Plato, especially in these late dialogues, does in fact posit 
such convictions sincerely.  
To begin, we find a concerted effort on the part of the Stranger throughout the Laws to prove that 
the gods do exist, and that, their supreme wisdom and control over the universe should serve as 
the basis from which the laws of men be established. See Laws 903bb-905d, 907a, 967b. See also 
Büttner, “Inspiration and Inspired Poets”. Büttner calls attention to Laws 811c, wherein, in defense 
of the legitimization of the constitution thus far constructed, the Stranger notes that their 
discussion has “not been conducted without a certain breath of the gods.” As Büttner argues, 
considering the context here, it seems unlikely that we are to take this claim ironically. See also 
Cristopher Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2002).  
Yet, this position is perhaps made most clearly in those instances wherein the Athenian Stranger 
is describing the various punishments to be levied upon those individuals who dishonor the gods, 
whether that offense arise as atheism, theft from a temple, or even the practicing of improper 
rituals, should be subjected to capital punishment. And, the strictest of these punishments is 
reserved for the atheist, as such an individual “…deserves to die for his sins not once or twice, but 
many times…” (Laws 908e2-3) Further, this condemnation for atheism should not be taken lightly, 
for, while there are other offenses Plato believes deserving of capital punishment aside from those 
pertaining to impiety, e.g., premeditated murder (871d), wounding a family member with the 
intention of murder (877b7-9), and waging a private war without the backing of the state (955c), 
that the punishment for atheism should be more severe than the punishment for violent charges 
is quite telling. Given the severity and consistency of this evidence, we have cause to take such 
references to the divine as sincere, especially in the late Platonic dialogues. 
I would like to thank Hal Thorsrud for his insightful comments which raised this issue to my 
attention. 
